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The news media are a defining feature of the crime and justice landscape. Especially today 
in a globalised context of hyper-mediatisation and high crime consciousness, news media 
representations are key indicators of the nature and extent of crime, the appropriateness 
and efficacy of criminal justice, and the wider state of the nation. Yet serious attention to 
news media within criminology has historically been patchy and recently appears alarmingly 
to have dropped off the radar. This chapter discusses the major theoretical issues and 
debates that have shaped what might loosely be termed news media criminology in Britain. 
It identifies key interventions, situating them both theoretically and chronologically in order 
to document the development of the field. What becomes apparent is just how few of the 
definitive interventions have come from within criminology. From its origins in the 1960s, 
the field of news media criminology was characterised by prolific and engaged research and 
a voracious interdisciplinarity that cut across the emerging areas of critical criminology, 
sociology of mass communications, media studies and cultural studies. Today, only research 
on content abounds and, as criminology has made the transition from field to discipline, that 
original enthusiasm for interdisciplinarity has been replaced with disciplinisation and self-
referentialism.  
 For the purposes of discussion, the theoretical history is divided into two broad 
categories corresponding with two broad time periods: Marxist and Post-Marxist. The 
period of Marxist interventions – roughly from the 1960s to the 1980s – was characterised 
by theoretical homogeneity. There were debates and conflicts within Marxism, and a wider 
context of theoretical pluralism within criminology. But the overriding concern shared 
across studies on news media, crime and justice was the reproduction of ‘dominant 
ideology’ and, though it was not always articulated in these terms, the legitimation of the 
‘Authoritarian State’. The question was not whether Marxism, but which Marxism. The Post-
Marxist period, in contrast, has been characterised by theoretical heterogeneity and 
fragmentation. There were direct challenges to Marxist readings from within, and the 
expansion of traditional class-based notions of ‘dominant ideology’ to embrace gender and 
ethnicity. But this period has also seen the emergence of new frameworks for 
understanding crime news that seek to move beyond the reproduction of ‘dominant 
ideology’ as the paradigmatic concern.  
 The first part of this chapter focuses on the Marxist and Post-Marxist theoretical 
perspectives that have shaped the field of news media criminology in Britain, bearing in 
mind that the most influential studies have not all been British. The second part explores 
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some of the key theoretical concepts that have remained central  to research on news 
media, crime and justice – newsworthiness, fear of crime and moral panic. The final part 
discusses current dilemmas in theory and research and suggests that new intellectual 
resources are needed to engage with the rapid, intersecting transformations in the crime, 
justice and media environments. In closing, I point to some areas that might benefit from 
further theoretical and empirical attention.  
 
 
Theoretical Perspectives  
 
Two theoretical paradigms shaped news media research in the 20th Century – the liberal 
pluralist paradigm and the control paradigm. Liberal pluralist approaches are underpinned 
by the ideals of classical liberal theory, and emphasize the principles of freedom, choice and 
democracy. From this perspective, news selection and production is shaped by public 
interests and consumer demand, the sovereignty of professional journalistic values, equal 
competition for media access by a diversity of news sources, and the collective values of a 
society built around more or less organic consensus. The role of the news media is to 
accurately inform audiences, protect democracy and serve the interests of the social 
majority. In contrast, control approaches are inﬂuenced by Marxist and critical theory, and 
stress the unequal distribution of economic and cultural power throughout society. Here, 
news selection and production is shaped by elite interests and the demands of capitalist 
enterprise, implicit and explicit constraints on media workers’ professional autonomy, the 
dominance of a narrow range of powerful sources, and the normalisation of ruling class 
values throughout a society built around a manufactured consensus. From this perspective, 
the role of news media is to reproduce dominant ideology, legitimate the capitalist system, 
and thus serve the interests of the ruling elite. The liberal pluralist paradigm tends to be 
popular among media practitioners and those who command cultural, economic and 
political power. The control paradigm has been far more influential within the academy, and 
has  predominated in research on news media, crime and justice.  
 
Marxist Interventions  
Three institutional Centres drove the development of British news media research in the 
sixties and seventies: the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) at 
Birmingham University, the Centre for Mass Communication Research (CMCR) at Leicester 
University and the Glasgow University Media Group (GUMG). None of these Centres were 
primarily criminological, yet their influence on theorising news media, crime and justice has 
been profound. The Centres were united in their rejection of the largely American tradition 
of liberal pluralism. Each advocated the multidisciplinary study of the communication 
process as a whole. And each sought to investigate media influence at the level of everyday 
social action rather than individual psychology. Ultimately, they were all concerned to 
understand the role of news media in the reproduction of ‘dominant ideology’. Alongside 
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their commonalities, however, there were important differences. Not least of these were 
the Centres’ different foundational disciplines and, relatedly, their contrasting readings and 
applications of Marxism and critical theory. The CCCS synthesised cultural studies and 
structural Marxism. The GUMG established a critical media studies that retained the action-
orientation of an instrumental Marxism. And the CMCR used the sociology of mass 
communications to develop a critical political economy. It is useful to briefly summarise 
some of the key differences between these readings of Marx, before considering how they 
shaped the work that each centre produced.  
 
Situating Marx 
Instrumental Marxists are concerned with how economic, political and cultural elites use 
their power in a market society to ensure that information flows and exchanges reinforce 
their own minority capitalist interests. This action-oriented reading of Marx requires on 
some level the acceptance of a unified elite with shared intent that is sufficiently coherent 
to manage the media in a uniform fashion. The media in this model are seen to work more 
or less directly in the service of the ruling class, and media content is shaped internally 
through newsroom hierarchies and journalistic self-censorship, and externally through 
direct pressures from, for example, advertising agencies, big business and government.  
 Structural Marxism detaches the workings of key structures and institutions – the 
state, the economy, the law, the education system, the media – from the conscious agency 
of the individuals within them. State institutions are seen to operate with relative 
autonomy, but nonetheless function together as part of a system that is structurally-
oriented to maintaining the dominance of the capitalist order. Structural Marxist media 
analysts are interested in how systems and processes of signification and representation 
collectively reproduce dominant ideology at the levels of popular discourse, understanding 
and everyday rituals, thus ensuring its normalisation and acceptance throughout society. 
Both instrumental and structural Marxists adhere to the base-superstructure metaphor and 
tend to remain faithful, in the final instance, to the notion of economic determination. But 
whereas an instrumental Marxist position sees power acting in a conscious, top-down 
manner, relatively unchallenged, structural Marxists highlight the contested nature of 
ideology and the requirement for dominant interests to be constantly re-negotiated and 
legitimated through state apparatuses and practices. News production here is structurally-
oriented, rather than individually directed, to reinforce the dominant ideology.  
 Finally, political economy theorists reject the action-oriented, interventionist 
approach adopted by instrumental Marxists, but are also critical of what is seen as structural 
Marxism’s over-reliance on ideological factors. Political economists focus their analyses on 
the relations between the economic processes and structures of media production and the 
ideological content of media. Unlike structural Marxists, who view ideology as relatively 
autonomous and more than simply a reflection of the economic base, political economists 
see ideology, along with other cultural processes, as of secondary importance to and 
determined by the economic requirements of capitalist accumulation. And whereas 
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structural Marxists see ideology as a site of ongoing struggle, political economists tend to 
view ideology as the means through which struggle is obliterated (Curran et al, 1982). It is 
those who command the greatest resources who ultimately achieve greatest success in 
putting their point of view across in news media coverage. Resource-starved organisations 
find themselves marginalised, and frequently excluded from the communications process 
altogether.  
 
Institutional Readings  
The central research interest of the CCCS was the relationship between popular culture and 
ideology and, in particular, the issue of meaning: how it is produced, ordered, negotiated – 
how it shapes and situates everyday existence at the level of cultural and social practices. 
Hall (1973) rejected the long-standing notion that meaning is an essential or fixed quality of 
media texts, insisting instead that they are ‘polysemic’ and can be read in multiple ways. 
How texts are ‘encoded’ by producers has no necessary connection with how they may 
subsequently be ‘decoded’ by consumers. Meaning was thus conceptualised as fluid, 
dynamic and subject to the influence of wider contextual factors like gender, race and class. 
Yet it can nonetheless be structured and ordered in particular ways through ideology. Thus a 
key concern was to understand how dominant ideology was reflected and reinforced in the 
mass media, and how it may variously be appropriated, resisted or subverted by everyday 
consumers. The CCCS’s particular form of Marxism derived from a synthesis of Althusser’s 
structuralism, Gramsci’s writings on hegemony, and Barthes’ semiotic work on texts. The 
resulting theoretical framework retained the core concerns of a structuralist approach, but 
sought to overcome what were seen as the restrictions of economic determination. Rather 
than being determined in any straightforward sense by the economic base-superstructure 
model, ideology was viewed as being implicitly embedded in all cultural structures and 
practices, including media production. This structural-culturalist approach to understanding 
news media and ideology was most influentially applied in Hall et al’s (1978) Policing the 
Crisis.  
 Hall et al (1978) explore the creation of a moral panic around ‘mugging’ during a 
period of economic recession, high unemployment and social unrest they identify with a 
‘crisis in hegemony’. Sensational media coverage of this ‘new’ crime wave simultaneously 
tapped into existing fears around law and order, race and social decline, and provided a folk 
devil – the young black street criminal – against whom all ‘respectable’ people could unite. 
The moral panic, and the wider sense of crisis it simultaneously invoked and represented, 
generated the right conditions for the state to reassert and relegitimate itself – policing the 
crisis, crucially with the consent of the people, by cracking down on the problem of crime. 
As Jefferson recalls (2008: 114), the authors were interested in understanding how the 
relatively autonomous institutions of the state – the police, the judiciary and the media 
(Althusser’s (1971) ideological state apparatus) – contributed to the panic independently, 
whilst simultaneously functioning collectively to reproduce the ideas of the ruling class: the 
dominant ideology. They suggested that dominant ideology is continually reproduced in the 
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media because news production is structurally oriented, in the name of journalistic 
‘objectivity’ and ‘impartiality’, to appeal first to those accredited experts who represent and 
command institutional power. This places powerful groups in the position to establish ‘an 
initial definition or primary interpretation of the topic in question’ (Hall et al, 1978: 58). 
Once the primary definition has been established it is extremely difficult to override, and 
future debate is contained within a forum of ‘controlled discourse’, governed by the primary 
definers:  
 
The media, then, do not simply ‘create’ the news; nor do they simply transmit the 
ideology of the ‘ruling class’ in a conspiratorial fashion. Indeed, we have suggested 
that, in a critical sense, the media are frequently not the ‘primary definers’ of news 
events at all; but their structured relationship to power has the effect of making them 
play a crucial but secondary role in reproducing the definitions of those who have 
privileged access, as of right, to the media as ‘accredited sources’. From this point of 
view, in the moment of news production, the media stand in a position of structured 
subordination to the primary definers (Hall et al, 1978: 59). 
 
In this reading, powerful institutional sources are the primary definers, while the media are 
reduced to playing a secondary role. Journalists are largely stripped of agency and influence. 
Their autonomy is removed.  
 Like the CCCS, the GUMG were motivated to explore ‘the vexed questions of cultural 
power and the consensual legitimation of beliefs’ (1976: 14 ) and both Centres were united 
in their rejection of economic determinism. While the ‘simple ‘base/superstructure’ view of 
broadcasting might account for a small proportion of output’, they argued, ‘it can in no way 
explain and analyse the inherent contradictions and varieties of permitted views and the 
surface openness that exists across the range of broadcasting output’ (GUMG, 1980: 412). 
The GUMG’s first major research project, Bad News (1976), combined quantitative and 
qualitative content analysis, supplemented with interviews and participant observation, to 
analyse television news coverage of industrial disputes (see also Eldridge, 2006). They found 
a clear absence of alternative views or comment to challenge the dominant ideological 
position, and explained what they call news ‘bias’ as follows (GUMG, 1976: 267-268):  
 
Our analysis goes beyond saying merely that the television news ‘favour’ certain 
individuals and institutions by giving them more time and status. Such criticisms are 
crude. The nature of our analysis is deeper than this: in the end it relates to the 
picture of society in general and industrial society in particular, that television news 
constructs. This at its most damaging… includes the laying of blame for society’s 
industrial and economic problems at the door of the workforce. This is done in the 
face of contradictory evidence which, when it appears, is either ignored, smothered, 
or at worst, is treated as if it supports the inferential frameworks utilized by the 




From this perspective media personnel are empowered with an agency and intentionality 
they are denied in the work of the CCCS. The GUMG’s follow-up study More Bad News 
(1980: 400) confirmed this view, finding that journalists ‘actively embrace’ the dominant 
ideological viewpoint ‘in a way that would be hard to justify as impartial’. Their activities 
include ‘not only the agenda-setting functions we have described, but also a systematic 
partiality in the reporting and interpretive use of government statistics’ (1980: 401). Here, 
journalists are not secondary players, ‘structurally subordinated’ in a communication 
process shaped by the cultural and economic power of state institutions. They are primary 
definers, and news is conceptualised as ‘the manifestation of the collective cultural codes of 
those employed to do this selective and judgemental work for society’ (1976: 14). Hall 
(1978) interpreted this action-oriented reading as a weakness, an instrumentalism betraying 
a ‘simplistic notion of television ‘bias’… as though simply directed by the ‘ruling class’’. 
Conversely, the GUMG saw in the CCCS a structural determinism that blinded them to, or, 
still worse, rendered insignificant the agency of news personnel and the crucial intervening 
role of senior media managers on the basis of fractional class interests.  
 The Centres also differed in their approach to empirical research. Whereas the CCCS 
drew from Louis Althusser, a structural Marxist who retained a deep scepticism toward 
empirical analysis, the GUMG identified more readily with Ralph Miliband, an instrumental 
Marxist who vociferously defended it. For Althusser, power operates in a non-linear fashion 
and derives from a set of ‘hidden relations’ that defy direct empirical investigation. 
However, underpinning structures of power, ideology and meaning can be revealed through 
theoretical analysis. From this perspective, research should be theory-led. More mundanely, 
the CCCS was poorly funded and staffed largely by humanities graduates with limited formal 
training in conducting empirical research. For financial and intellectual reasons, then, their 
primary research site was the text, not the street. Of course, much empirical work was 
carried out at the CCCS, including classic ethnographies (Willis, 1977; Hebdidge, 1979) and 
the groundbreaking audience research by Morley and Brunsdon (Morley, 1980; Brunsdon 
and Morley, 1978). But throughout the 1970s it was inconsistent and sometimes 
marginalised in studies that prioritised theoretical sophistication. In Resistance Through 
Rituals (1976), for example, ‘literary ethnography’ takes the place of direct empirical 
observation (Blackman, 1998). And despite its detailed, if unsystematic, newspaper content 
analysis, the key focus of Policing the Crisis, as Bennett notes (1982: 302), is less on the 
relationship between ideology and ‘reality’, and more on the relationship between 
ideologies. In contrast, the GUMG developed what they describe as a ‘positivist critique, 
though not in any arcane sense of limiting itself to checking and producing the facts’. The 
aim in Bad News (1976) was to analyse how ‘viewers were given a misleading portrayal of 
industrial disputes in the UK when measured against the independent reality of events’ 
(1980, xiii). For this group of just-as-poorly-funded but empirically trained sociologists, 
developing theory should not come at the expense of empirically testing it. This, for the 
GUMG, was a fundamental problem within the CCCS and cultural studies more generally. 
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Privileging the symbolic over the material simultaneously privileges the abstract-theoretical 
over the substantive-empirical. Theory is enough: no further evidence is required (Philo, 
1999 ; Philo and Miller, 2001).  
 The political economy approach of the Leicester CMCR was grounded in the 
sociology of mass communications, and empirically-oriented. The aim was to explore the 
relations between the economic structure and organization of the cultural industries, their 
ideological content, and wider social, cultural and political life. With respect to media 
production, the CMCR sought to understand the role of mass communications in the 
maintenance and legitimation of structural inequalities in a class society. Whilst the CCCS 
and the GUMG were united in their rejection of economic determination, the CMCR placed 
economic forces at the heart of the media production process. For Murdock and Golding 
(1977:37) these forces:  
 
…work consistently to exclude those voices lacking economic power or resources… the 
underlying logic of cost operates systematically, consolidating the position of groups 
already established in the main mass-media markets and excluding those groups who 
lack the capital base required for successful entry. Thus the voices which survive will 
largely belong to those least likely to criticize the prevailing distribution of wealth and 
power. Conversely, those most likely to challenge these arrangements are unable to 
publicize their dissent or opposition because they cannot command resources needed 
for effective communication to a broad audience.  
 
Members clearly acknowledged the relevance of other factors in the news production 
process, including the ‘controls and constraints imposed by the state and the political 
sphere’ and ‘the inertia exerted by dominant cultural codes and traditions’ (Golding and 
Murdock, 1979: 198). They also accepted the ‘‘relative autonomy’ of production personnel 
and the ‘pertinent effects of professional ideologies and practices’ (ibid.). But these factors 
were of secondary importance to the material and determining impact of economic forces. 
The Leicester CMCR’s political economy approach thus represented a return to the base-
superstructure metaphor. The role of media is that of ‘legitimation through the production 
of false consciousness, in the interests of a class which owns and controls the media’ 
(Bennett, 1982: 26). This macro-sociological account of control through concentration of 
ownership, monopolisation and diversification lay beyond the reach of a micro-oriented 
culturalist framework. As Golding and Murdock (2000: 72) put it, ‘Cultural studies offers an 
analysis of the ways the cultural industries work that has little or nothing to say about how 
they actually operate as industries, and how their economic organisation impinges on the 
production and circulation of meaning. Nor does it examine the ways in which people’s 
consumption choices are structured by their position in the wider economic formation. 




 In one of the CMCR’s first major texts, Halloran, Elliott and Murdock (1970) analysed 
press and television reporting of the 1968 Vietnam demonstrations in London’s Grosvenor 
Square. Building on the work of Lang and Lang (1955) and Boorstin (1963), they developed 
the notion of ‘inferential structures’ – frameworks which guide journalists’ construction of 
‘events as news’ on the basis of values and definitions already legitimated in the public 
mind; that is, on the basis of the prevailing consensus:  
 
The media can create ‘news’ which is based not on the event itself but on those 
aspects of it to which they have assigned a particular prominence, i.e. the ‘event as 
news’… in other words, the event achieves reality by being reported, while in addition 
consequences may flow from the report which actually shape the original reality in 
accordance with the meaning given to it by the ‘news’ (Halloran et al, 1970: 90).  
 
By combining this framework with an analysis of ‘news values’ adapted from the work of 
Norwegian media researchers Galtung and Ruge (1965), Halloran et al (1970: 315, emphasis 
in original) illustrate the media’s role in ‘defining the situation and in cultivating the 
assumption that this is the way it is’. They  illustrate how the demonstrations were defined 
early on as likely to involve violence between the forces of law and order (the police) and 
the forces of anarchy (the demonstrators). Though the protests turned out to be largely 
peaceful, the event was still reported in line with the dominant inferential structure – the 
‘framework of violence’ – and thus it was the issue of violence, minimal though it was, that 
provided ‘the news’. The influence of the CMCR’s work on ‘inferential structures’ is evident 
in Hall’s et al’s (1978: 59) model of ‘primary definition’, and in the GUMG’s analyses of 
television news ‘bias’ (GUMG, 1976, 1980). It also featured across a number of classic crime 
news analyses that emerged from the interdisciplinary environment of the time, most 
vividly encapsulated within the National Deviancy Conference.  
 
The National Deviancy Conference and the Violent Society   
As the Leicester and Birmingham Centres were developing their particular institutional 
research approaches in the late 1960s (the GUMG would not be established until 1974), a 
critical criminology was finding form in the National Deviancy Conference (NDC). The NDC 
was not contained within any one institution. Nevertheless, it constituted the 
institutionalisation of critical criminological theory and research. What is so striking about 
this period is that news media research commanded a significant presence within critical 
criminology; a presence that, for reasons outlined later in this chapter, is missing today. 
Though not a direct product of the NDC meetings, The Manufacture of News: Deviance, 
Social Problems and the Mass Media (1973) combined contributions by core NDC members 
with a series of previously published and original pieces by leading media researchers across 
a range of fields. Motivated by the belief that much mainstream media research was ‘on the 
wrong lines’, and deliberately stepping away from American mainstream concerns regarding 
the direct effects of media exposure, Cohen and Young (1973: 10) wanted to explore ‘the 
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conceptions of deviance and social problems revealed in the mass media and the implicit 
view of society behind such conceptions’. Hall and Murdock both provided chapters – Hall 
on the ideological role of news photographs, and the representation of violence (Hall, 1971, 
1973), and Murdock (1973) on the reporting of political deviance. Other chapters analysed 
news values, representations of sexuality and race, and moral panics. The contributions 
encapsulated the Marxism and shared politics that defined news media criminology at that 
time, presenting work by the CCCS and CMCR side-by-side, and offered an clear, if critical, 
endorsement of control readings of news production.  
 The Marxist reading of news media, crime and justice was further reinforced by 
Chibnall (1977). Combining content analysis with interviews and observations, and drawing 
heavily from the work of the CCCS and the CMRC, Chibnall (1975: 115-116) established that 
law-and-order-news ‘neutralizes deviant world views by either denying their status as 
beliefs which should be taken seriously by sensible people, or condemning them as 
manifestations of wickedness or corruption’. This elite-orientation is not, however, a 
‘product of editorial conspiracy, but a reflection of the social organization of reporting, and 
the professional imperatives and commercial interests which underlie it’ (ibid.). The 
explanatory framework leans toward a structural rather than action-oriented understanding 
of news production. Regarding journalist-source power relations, Chibnall finds that ‘the 
journalist is always in an inferior negotiating position – the journalist who cannot get 
information is out of a job, whereas the policeman who retains it is not’ (Chibnall, 1977: 
155). This notion of ‘structured subordination’ was simultaneously being developed in the 
CCCS mugging research and would find full articulation as the theory of ‘primary definition’ 
in Policing the Crisis (1978). Though the two studies emerged ‘quite autonomously’ 
(Chibnall, 1977: 76), they overlap significantly in their theoretical approach and substantive 
interest in how the press communicated public anxieties at a time of rapid social change and 
mobilised the blanket conceptualisations ‘Violent Society’ and ‘Law and Order crisis’ to 
capture the public imagination. The differences lie in their methodologies and overall aims. 
Chibnall (1977) used content analysis, interviews and observation to deconstruct crime 
news and identify its component parts, locating crime reporting within the wider context of 
press ideology and political economy. Hall et al (1978) employed content analysis to 
investigate the creation of a moral panic around mugging as part of wider efforts to 
legitimate the shift toward an authoritarian state at a time of hegemonic crisis. Chibnall 
looks at the everyday, while Hall et al focus on the exceptional; Chibnall theorises the 
ideological role of the news media, while Hall et al explore the news media to formulate a 
theory of the Authoritarian state.   
 
From Authoritarian State to National Security State  
In a study that postdates the British Marxist work by a decade, and remains influential in 
British news media criminology and critical criminology today, Herman and Chomsky (1988: 
298) developed their ‘propaganda model’, in which ‘the raw material of news’ passes 
through five filters, ‘leaving only the cleansed residue fit to print’. The five filters are media 
10 
 
ownership and profit orientation, the influence of advertising, the role of experts, ‘flak’ as a 
means of disciplining the media, and anti-communism as the ‘national religion’. Through 
meticulous empirical research on the reporting of ‘terrorism’ and close consideration of the 
media’s alleged collusion in the ‘criminalisation’ of non-friendly regimes, Herman and 
Chomsky demonstrate how economic, political, military and cultural elites effectively 
conspire to control the content and flow of media information. As in much British Marxist 
research, journalists are seen to have little influence or autonomy in the news production 
process. Power lies with the state and large corporations. Whilst journalists may feel they 
are acting objectively and writing in accordance with prevailing and accepted journalistic 
news values, in practice they are subordinated to reproduce the interests of an active ruling 
elite. Thus, Herman and Chomsky cast the news media as a key functionary of the ‘National 
Security State’, operating to ‘manufacture consent’ around elite ideas in the name of the 
‘national interest’ and, in so doing, engendering acceptance of a social order that reflects 
the interests of a powerful few, rather than the wider majority.  
 
The Decline of Marxism and the Fracturing of Critical Criminology  
Though different researchers got there by different theoretical and methodological means, 
and presented different levels of evidence to substantiate their respective claims, Marxist 
interventions shared an overriding concern with the power of ruling class interests to 
marginalize dissenting discourses and opinion and maintain the socio-cultural and economic 
status quo. By the late 1970s Marxism was losing influence within the social sciences, and 
the critical criminology that found collective expression in the NDC was fragmenting. When 
Manufacturing Consent (1988) was published in the US, itself running against the grain of 
more nuanced studies of news production, the Marxist turn in British social sciences had 
passed. With it, criminological interest in news media markedly declined.  Critical 
Criminology split into four distinct domains – Critical Criminology, Left Realist Criminology, 
Governmental Criminology, and Critical Legal Studies (see McLaughlin, Chapter x, this 
collection).  
 For Critical Criminology the media’s role in constructing the Authoritarian State and 
the Violent Society had been demonstrated: the media work had been done. For Left Realist 
Criminology, media research had been colonised by Critical Criminologists – an issue of 
moral panics, deviancy amplification and ideological mystification. Furthermore, in the 
victimisation survey Left Realists found a means to get behind media representations and 
ideological mystifications and to access the empirical reality of the crime problem: a 
problem, they insisted, was palpably not a media construction. For Governmental 
Criminology, Foucault provided news ways of exploring relations of power and knowledge at 
the level of micro-institutional discourses. Media discourses were of little interest in this 
context. And Critical Legal Studies focused on the operation of law, again with little space 
for media research. Within each of these new manifestations of critical criminology, news 
media work was no longer a priority. Within orthodox criminology the news media were 
then, as they are today, a curiosity to be engaged with between research projects and, even 
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then, to be explored largely though positivistic, quantitative content analysis. Thus, as was 
the case before the NDC gave rise to a succession of groundbreaking, multidisciplinary 
analyses, researching news media, crime and justice in the UK fell to those outside 
criminology. The studies that emerged in this post-Marxist climate, including those 
conducted by members of the three Centres, would foreground different elements of news 
selection and production, challenging the determinism that had characterised so much 
critical research and seeking a more holistic understanding of the mass communication 
process.  
 
Post-Marxist Interventions  
Throughout the 1980s the theoretical homogeneity that characterised the period of 
predominantly Marxist research on news media, crime and justice gave way to a more 
pluralistic period of theoretical development. A growing body of media research came to 
challenge what was perceived as the over-determinism inherent within Marxist variants of 
the control paradigm, most explicit in instrumental readings of news production, but also 
evident in structuralist work. The underpinning idea that, in the last instance, the news 
media operate as a ‘largely uncritical conduit for official views’ (Schlesinger, Murdock and 
Elliot, 1983: 166), was identified as a particular point of contention. The conception of  
dominant ideology was also diversified in this period to explore the ideological legitimation 
of inequalities not only in terms of class, but also in terms of gender, race and other social 
divisions. And new theoretical frameworks emerged that focused on aspects of the social 
formation other than class.  
 Over three books that remain widely cited in British research today, Ericson, Baranek 
and Chan (1987;1989;1991) produced a highly sophisticated and detailed analysis of 
journalistic practices, source activities, and the role of news as an agency of social control 
across Canadian television, press and radio. Through a combination of content analysis, 
interviews and ethnographic observation they explore how journalists and sources engage 
in ‘legitimation work’ in the representation of crime and justice, and how news contributes 
to the formation of a stable ‘symbolic canopy’, based on but not restricted to dominant 
ideology, that helps to reinforce the ‘consensual paradigm’ for society as a whole (Ericson et 
al, 1987: 27-43). Ericson et al are avowedly anti-instrumentalist in their approach. And 
whilst they draw much from the structural Marxist work of Hall et al (1978) and Chibnall 
(1977), the political economy work of the CMCR, and the methods of the GUMG, they 
remain critical of the determinism inherent within the control paradigm. Research has 
consistently reaffirmed the asymmetrical relations between journalists and powerful 
sources, they argue, because it has been ‘grounded in the perspective of journalists’ (ibid: 
125) and thus overlooks the important levels of ‘convergence’ between media and source 
organisations. Consideration of source perspectives reveals that the police, for example, are 
constrained by news discourses just as journalists are constrained by police discourses: 
‘police-reporter transactions entail controls from both sides, and interdependency’ (Ericson 
et al, 1989: 125). In Canada, just as in Britain, ‘the police are the primary definers of crime 
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and its control to the public’ (1989: 123). But while the police ‘controlled the primary 
definitions of the subject of address (crime, criminality and its control by the police), they 
sensed a loss of control over the specific terms of the communication process’ (Ericson et al, 
1989: 123). The news media ‘provide a somewhat open terrain for struggles for justice, even 
though particular issues and institutional sources predominate. The documented variation 
by medium and market shows pluralism in meanings and values’ (Ericson et al, 1991: i).  
 This challenge to the control paradigm was also reflected in British news media 
research. In a number of large-scale studies on the press and television coverage of 
terrorism, industrial conflict and crime, Schlesinger, Tumber, Murdock, and Elliott, in various 
combinations, argued that privileging journalist perspectives overlooks the complexities of 
source-media management strategies, inter-source competition and journalist-source 
power relations. In relation to representations of terrorism, for example, Schlesinger, 
Murdock and Elliott (1983: 32) find that, though official perspectives predominate, media 
images ‘were a good deal more diverse and complex than simpler assumptions about 
television’s relation to the state and to dominant ideology predict’. In direct reference to 
the structural-culturalist work of Hall et al (1978), Schlesinger, Tumber and Murdock (1991: 
399) argue that ‘‘Primary definition’, which ought to be an empirically ascertainable 
outcome, is taken instead to be an a priori effect of the privileged access of the powerful’. 
Combining content analysis and interviews with journalists and sources, these authors 
confirm that definitional advantage is structurally determined to a degree, but it can seldom 
be guaranteed (see also Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994). Access to the media is not, as Hall 
et al (1978: 59) would have it, simply granted ‘as of right’. It needs to be won through a 
variety of carefully managed media methods and practices that can be subject to frequent 
disruption. Off the record disclosures and internal leaks cannot be totally managed. By 
definition these interventions may stray from the official line and diminish considerably the 
extent to which powerful institutions can maintain a coherent organisational voice, still less 
ensure definitional control in the news media. Nor does the theory of primary definition 
account for the actions taken by non-official sources to enter into and sometimes 
successfully reframe the terms of a given debate. Furthermore, the notion of journalistic 
‘structured subordination’ fails to account for occasions on which media actively challenge 
powerful institutions on issues of policy or practice, or investigative exposés force undesired 
or unintended official responses (Miller, 1998, 1993; Greer and McLaughlin, 2010). 
Schlesinger and colleagues (1983, 1989, 1991, 1994) insist that flows of information 
between journalists and sources are more complex than Marxist readings suggested, and 
that the reproduction of elite ideas in news content, though structurally advantaged, is by 
no means guaranteed. The dominance of any ideological position should be considered an 
‘achievement rather than a wholly structurally determined outcome’ (Schlesinger, 1989: 
79).  
 These arguments against the control paradigm could only be mounted from within 
that paradigmatic framework. The dominant ideology thesis had, in effect, established the 
‘inferential structure’ or ‘primary definition’ within which further discussion or debate took 
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place. The fundamental problematic remained the reproduction of dominant ideology as 
defined through class. With the development of critical feminist research on crime reporting 
the control paradigm underwent some conceptual reconfiguration. Here, dominant ideology 
is no less important, but it is framed primarily in terms of gender, and relates to the 
tendency of news reports to reinforce gender stereotypes that maintain unequal power 
relations, including economic inequality, in a patriarchal society. Though critical feminist 
research on crime news has been plentiful (Cameron and Fraser, 1987; Soothill and Walby, 
1991; Meyers, 1997), only a few studies have engaged in depth with production processes 
(see, for example, Chancer, 2003; Kitzinger and Skidmore, 1995). One important example, 
influential in the British context, is Benedict’s (1992) radical feminist analysis of the 
reporting of five high profile sex crime cases in the US. Benedict worked as a journalist and a 
rape counsellor before entering academia. This professional insight supplements content 
analysis, interviews with journalists and editors, and an academic feminist reading of power, 
gender, race and class to explore the structural and cultural arrangements that shape press 
reporting of sexual violence against women. The central theme is the prevailing tendency to 
polarise women in sex crime cases into either ‘virgins’ or ‘whores’ (ibid.: 26). It is suggested 
that the press’ insensitive and sometimes cruel treatment of women in sex crime cases is 
seldom due to individual malice. Rather, it results from characteristics of society that are 
deeply embedded within the culture, namely the gender-biased nature of language and 
prevailing myths about women, sex and rape. These myths, or dominant ideological 
meanings, guide how news is both produced and processed, but do so implicitly in a way 
that can influence even the most well meaning commentators. Thus, ‘a myth-saturated 
woman will be just as insensitive to rape cases as a myth-saturated man, especially given 
the conditions and habits of newsroom behaviour’ (1992: 6). This is structural-culturalism 
read through gender. Of course, much critical feminist research retains a clear Marxist 
sensibility, and class, if not the defining factor, remains a core concern. In the period of post-
Marxist news media criminology, other frameworks emerged to further challenge class as 
the defining problematic.   
 For ‘risk society’ theorists, the transition from modernity to late-modernity has been 
characterised by a shift away from the focus on economic inequality and toward the nature, 
patterning and control of ‘risk’ (Beck, 1992). Whereas modernity was characterised by the 
positive problem of acquiring ‘goods’ (income, education, housing and health), the ‘risk 
society’ is characterised by the negative problem of avoiding ‘bads’ (global warming, AIDS, 
pollution… and crime). In the unequal society, the distribution of ‘goods’ could be broadly 
understood in terms of class. In the unsafe or ‘risk’ society, ‘bads’ are global and affect 
everyone more or less equally, regardless of class position. Collectivism is replaced by 
individualism. The state and its agencies are problems rather than solutions. Remedies to 
problems are not to be found in social policy, but in changing the behaviour of the people 
responsible (Reiner et al, 2001). In the shift from the class society to the risk society, the 
control paradigm’s focus on dominant ideology loses purchase. It is the ‘risk society’ that 
provides the conceptual framework for Reiner, Allen and Livingstone’s (2000, 2001) 
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research on media representations of crime and justice in the post-War era. They find that 
over time news reports of criminal offending include less acknowledgement of possible 
structural causation and more condemnation of what is presented as individual evil. 
Portrayals of criminal justice remain broadly supportive, but are increasingly complex and 
critical, focusing more, for example, on police ineffectiveness, systemic corruption, and 
conflict between official institutions. And, in the most significant change, crime victims shift 
from being incidental characters to becoming the central focus for highly emotionalised 
news stories built around their experiences of suffering (Reiner et al., 2000: 187). The study 
does not engage with the news production process (though it does engage with audiences), 
and thus does not address changing journalist-source relations. But the risk society is a 
useful theoretical framework within which to explore media representations of crime and 
justice, and the changing political and cultural sensibilities that shape the late modern 
condition. Given the extent to which the thesis has been embraced by criminologists, it is 
surprising that it has not featured in more criminological analyses of the news.  
 
 
Theoretical Concepts  
 
Theoretical perspectives rise and fall, and drift in and out of academic favour. Theoretical 
concepts have an enduring and defining significance: they can be radically theorised and 
theorised in radically different ways, but they exist independently of the various theoretical 
positions within which they may be situated.  As such, theoretical concepts are more than 
just research sites; they have an existence and life of their own. Three concepts that 
continue to shape the research agenda in news media criminology are newsworthiness, fear 
of crime and moral panics.   
 
Crime Newsworthiness  
Journalists’ decisions regarding newsworthiness – which events to select for inclusion as 
news, and how to present those events once selected – are informed by their sense of 
‘news values’. The first academic exploration of news values was presented by Norwegian 
media researchers Galtung and Ruge (1965). Their analysis resulted in the identification of 
twelve news values that, they suggested, work collectively to inform the selection and 
production of events as news. This theoretical framework has been adopted and adapted by 
myriad researchers since, and features prominently in many of the studies discussed above. 
Remarkably, Galtung and Ruge’s (1965) original insights were based on content analysis and, 
as they put it, ‘a simplified psychology of perception and some additional assumptions’ 
(1965: 64). No journalists or sources were interviewed or observed. ‘The proper thing to do’, 
they conceded, ‘in order to test their validity would be to observe journalists at work… and 
we have no such data. For want of this the [news values] should be anchored in general 
reasoning and social science findings’ (1965: 66). Forty years later, after much empirical 
testing, it is striking how well their framework still stands up to scrutiny .  
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 There are of course variations in emphasis and articulation across studies, and some 
more substantive differences, but the different accounts are most notable for their 
similarities. A consideration of news values helps us understand the nature of media 
content. Crime and justice events that are technologically accessible, easy to visualize, meet 
the required threshold for news visibility and fit within the routines and cycles of news 
production are more likely to be covered than abstract issues and debates that develop over 
longer periods. This event-orientation promotes a corresponding focus on individuals (as 
victims, offenders, justice officials). Individualization and personalization promote the 
simplification of news stories and serve to reinforce the common association between 
criminality and individual pathology rather than wider social, structural and political factors. 
Interpersonal crimes of sex and violence can be more easily presented as dramatic and 
titillating than non-violent crimes – for example, most property offences – particularly when 
they have high levels of proximity (spatial nearness and cultural meaningfulness) to the 
consumer. Crimes are more newsworthy if they are particularly audacious, violent or novel, 
involve famous or notable people, or take place in famous or notable places. Crimes are also 
more likely to be reported if they feature ‘ideal victims’, for example young children or older 
people, and there is a risk of further attacks.  
 Most sociological accounts have explored newsworthiness from the perspective of 
journalists, prioritizing their consideration of the pragmatics of news production, their 
assumptions about audience interests, and their assessment of the likely relevance and 
impact of the story on those audiences. The focus is on the background factors – 
organizational, ideological, cultural, economic – that shape the selection and production of 
crime as news, prior to its dissemination to audiences. However, Katz (1987) points out that 
‘whatever the influences on new organizations that affect their selection and rejection of 
particular stories, daily newsreaders have an independent fascination with the stories that 
are published’ (Katz, 1987: 48). Katz thus theorises newsworthiness from the perspective of 
the consumer, and is interested in understanding the symbolic relevance and psycho-social 
utility of crime news. The principal focus here, then, is on the foreground factors – 
existential, moral, emotional – that make crime news ‘required reading’ for people on a 
daily basis. Whilst ‘novelty’ had been identified as a key determinant of crime 
newsworthiness across most research studies, Katz offers a different interpretation. His 
analyses suggests that the most newsworthy crimes seldom appear to be particularly 
unexpected or novel. Political scandals and stories of high level corruption confirm for many 
what they knew all along, yet such stories invariably attract considerable media attention. 
Banks are routine targets for robberies, yet they continue to generate substantial media 
interest when they are hit. If the key to understanding crime newsworthiness is not its 
unexpectedness, Katz argues (1987: 63), a more fruitful approach may be to consider 
crime’s ‘symbolic value in articulating the normatively expected’. From this perspective, 
crime is not newsworthy because it appeals to readers’ base or morbid interests, or because 
it shocks them in the short term, or frightens them in the long term. Rather, crime is 
newsworthy because its reporting presents readers with the opportunity to engage in a 
16 
 
daily ritual moral workout, allowing them to question and confirm (or otherwise) their own 
moral fortitude. In essence, crime news ‘speaks dramatically to issues that are of direct 
relevance to readers’ existential challenges, whether or not readers are preoccupied with 
the possible personal misfortune of becoming victims to crime’ (Katz, 1987: 68).  
 
Fear of Crime  
There has been much debate around an adequate definition of fear that might be applied to 
explorations of news media – or other factors – and fear of crime (Hope and Sparks, 2000). 
Some commentators have queried the apparent academic preoccupation with endowing 
the concept of ‘fear’ with essentialist qualities that, for the purposes of longitudinal and 
comparative research, persist across time and place (Bourke, 2005). Others have questioned 
the tendency to characterise fear of crime as an unqualified social ill, and asked if some level 
of ‘functional fear’ – as opposed to ‘dysfunctional worry’ – might in fact be ‘a motivating 
force that encourages vigilance and stimulates precautionary activity’ (Jackson and Gray, 
2010). Particularly within the context of high crime societies, purportedly characterised by 
‘existential anxiety’ and ‘ontological insecurity’ and giving rise to ‘criminologies of everyday 
life’ (Giddens, 1991; Bauman, 1997; Garland, 2001), ‘fear’ can become a catchall phrase 
used to describe any range of emotional responses. It can be intimately connected, for 
example, with anger, distrust, shame, jealousy and rage, as well as vigilance, consideration 
and caution, and cannot be easily isolated for empirical analysis. What is most important, 
argues Bourke (2005), is the social and cultural context in which the term is used, when it is 
used, and by whom.  
 The most widely cited body of literature on media and fear of crime also clearly 
demonstrates some of the main conceptual and methodological problems within this field 
of research. Gerbner et al’s ‘cultivation research’ has over several decades explored the 
correlation between viewing television violence and beliefs regarding politics, public safety 
and social order (Gerbner and Gross, 1976; Gerbner et al., 1994). The central finding is that 
‘heavy’ television viewers cultivate a world-view which more closely resembles the 
‘television message’ than ‘light’ television viewers. Because television overstates both the 
seriousness and risk of criminal victimization, portraying the world as ‘mean and scary’, 
heavy viewing is said to cultivate higher fear of crime. Fearful citizens tend to be 
depoliticised, more dependent on established authority, more punitive, and more likely to 
acquiesce to authoritarian measures of control. The now well rehearsed problems with the 
cultivation project include: its simplification and de-contextualising of the categories 
‘media’, ‘violence’ and ‘fear’; its attempts to quantify the creative and highly variable 
processes of interpretation and influence; and its search for a straightforward causal 
connection between media and fear of crime (Sparks, 1992; Ditton et al, 2004). Yet the 
central claim underpinning cultivation research – that particular forms of distorted and 
distorting media communication can generate widespread anxiety, punitive sentiments, and 
the tacit acceptance of authoritarian governance – finds much wider support. This position 
is explicit in Hall et al’s (1978) Policing the Crisis, where it is read through a Gramscian 
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reading of the state’s repressive response to a ‘crisis in hegemony’. It is central to recent 
and widespread claims that the state is harnessing a culture of fear in a post-9/11 risk 
society in order to legitimate tough anti-terror legislation or, more generally, to govern 
through crime (Simon, 2006; Mythen and Walklate, 2006; Furedi, 2005). Analysts of ‘penal 
populism’, now an organising concept within criminology, have been at pains to understand 
the roles of mass media and fear of crime, both individually and in terms of their 
interconnections, in the apparent rise of punitive sentiment and the collapse of faith in the 
ability of authorities to deliver public protection (Bottoms, 1995; Roberts et al, 2003; Pratt, 
2007). Yet empirically substantiating the intuitive connection between these variables 
remains elusive.  
 The more revealing research has moved beyond the search for simplistic causal 
connections, and sought to develop a contextually aware understanding of media and fear 
of crime. Kitzinger and Skidmore’s (1995: 12) study on news coverage of child sex abuse 
uses mixed-methods to explore news content, production and, crucially, consumption and 
influence. Both members of the Glasgow University Media Group, Kitzinger and Skidmore 
were instrumental in developing the GUMG’s particular brand of audience research. Here, 
focus groups are run to assess ‘the potential and limits of people’s ability to deconstruct and 
‘resist’ media accounts’ (1995: 1). The group discussions raised the useful distinction 
between intellectual and emotional knowledge. While most participants ‘knew’ abuse 
happened more often in domestic or institutional settings, ‘their fear often focused on 
external sites such as woodland or wasteland’ (ibid.: 9). And though many ‘knew’ that abuse 
is most often committed by someone the child knows, ‘their fear focused on strangers’ 
(ibid.: 9). In fact, they argue, ‘audience understandings of how they might detect child 
abuse, the sources of danger and their ideas about intervention were often in conflict with 
the information which children’s charities and social work agencies are trying to promote’ 
(ibid.: 8). This contextual understanding of media and fear of crime has been probed further 
by Ditton et al (2004), whose combination of quantitative questionnaires and qualitative 
interviews revealed that it is not the ‘objectively determined randomness, localness or 
sensationalism that is important, but rather the interpretation of media content as relevant 
to and by the consumer’ (Ditton et al., 2004: 607).   
 
Moral Panics  
The term ‘moral panic’ was first used by Young (1971) in his study of subcultures and 
drugtaking. Cohen (1972) developed and extended the concept in his analysis of the 
sensationalistic, heavy handed and ultimately ‘disproportionate’ reaction to  the Mods and 
Rockers disturbances in an English seaside resort in 1964. Though the damage was in 
financial terms minor, Cohen traces the spiralling social reaction through initial intolerance, 
media stereotyping, moral outrage, increased surveillance, labelling and marginalisation, 
and deviancy amplification leading to further disturbances that seemed justify the initial 
concerns. The flamboyant misbehaviour of youth subcultures, independent and sexually and 
economically liberated, affronted the post-War values of hard work, sobriety and deferred 
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gratification. At a time of rapid social change, they were a visible index of a world that was 
slipping away – ‘folk devils’ who provided a crystallising focus for social anxiety and 
‘respectable fears’. Reflecting the pluralistic theoretical interests of the NDC, Cohen built 
upon social constructionism, symbolic interactionism, deviancy amplification and labelling, 
but also incorporated the lesser known academic literature on ‘disaster research’ to 
describe the various phases of a moral panic – warning, impact, inventory, reaction – and 
chart its progression. In his analysis of the mass communication process, he drew in 
particular from the Leicester CMCR’s work on ‘inferential structures’ (Halloran et al, 1970). 
These theoretical resources were combined with in depth content analysis, questionnaires, 
interviews, and voluntary work in the local community to develop a fully sociological 
account of youth, culture, change and anxiety in post-War Britain.  
 Hall et al (1978) politicised the concept of moral panic. In their analysis of a 
‘mugging’ moral panic as an ideological intervention to address an escalating crisis in state 
hegemony (see above), it was inevitable that the concept would be read through the CCCS’s 
particular form of structural Marxism. Yet Policing the Crisis draws also from an eclectic mix 
of influences, connecting ‘new deviancy theory, news media studies and research on urban 
race relations with political economy, state theory and notions of ideological consent’ 
(McLaughlin, 2008: 146). For some critical criminologists, it represents the high point of 
Marxist theorising about crime, law and order and the state (Crime, Media, Culture, Special 
Section, 4,1). Acknowledging the sophistication within the CCCS work, Cohen (2007) has 
nonetheless noted a wider tendency to over-politicise the concept at the expense of its 
sociological meaning and application. Hall (2007) has suggested in response that 
politicisation was a necessary developmental stage, and that the full explanatory potential 
of the moral panic concept was, in fact, only realised through its construction as ideology.  
 Goode and Ben Yehuda (1994) developed Cohen’s discussion of moral panic by 
paying particular attention to the criteria that should be in place before it can be suggested 
that a ‘moral panic’ is occurring. They identify five key features of the phenomenon: (i) 
concern (a reported condition or event generates anxiety); (ii) hostility (the condition or 
event is condemned and, where there are clearly identifiable individuals who can be 
blamed, these are portrayed as ‘folk devils’); (iii) consensus (the negative social reaction is 
widespread and collective); (iv) disproportionality (the extent of the problem and the threat 
is poses are exaggerated); (v) volatility (media attention and the associated panic emerge 
suddenly and with intensity, but can dissipate quickly too).  
 ‘Moral panic’ is one of the most widely used terms in the sociological analysis of 
crime and justice, and has transcended academic discourses to become commonplace in 
political rhetoric and popular conversation (Altheide, 2009). Given its prolific usage, it is 
surprising that few commentators have subjected the concept to sustained and rigorous 
critical investigation.  With the split in the criminological left in the late-1970s, the concept 
was dismissed by Left Realists as ‘left idealism’, and accused of obfuscating the painful 
‘realities’ of criminal victimisation by propagating the view that ‘the crime problem’ is 
socially constructed (Young, 1979). In exploring the anatomy of the concept, critics have 
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queried the notions of ‘disproportionality’ and ‘volatility’. The first, since this assumes a 
superior knowledge of the objective reality of the issue against which the reaction is 
measured, and a corresponding assumption of what a ‘proportionate’ reaction would look 
like (Waddington, 1986). The second, because in a contemporary multi-media world 
characterised by ontological insecurity and state of a permanent free-floating anxieties, the 
notion of discreet, self-contained, volatile moral panics may need some rethinking 
(McRobbie and Thornton, 1995). Cohen has responded to all of these criticisms (Cohen, 
2002). But such critical interventions, both from within and outside of criminology, have 
barely interrupted the general tendency to arbitrarily apply the concept to explain 
everything from global warning to ‘Swine Flu’. The broadly uncritical application of the 
moral panic concept has led Garland (2008) to reassert two elements of the original 
analysis, which are absent from many contemporary studies: (i) the moral dimension of the 
social reaction – most issues can be moralised, but many are not in and of themselves 
‘moral’, and cannot automatically be analysed as such; and (ii) the idea that the deviant 
conduct in question is somehow symptomatic of a wider problem – a threat to established 
values, or a particular way of life.  
 
 
Theoretical Dilemmas  
 
In order to make sense of contemporary news media representations of crime and justice, it 
is necessary take account of dramatic changes in both the crime and justice and media 
arenas, and to engage in depth with the increasingly interactive relationship between them.  
Within criminology there is now a substantial literature detailing transformations across the 
crime and justice landscape. Different scholars foreground different elements and explain 
them in different ways, but the commonalities across accounts are significant, and include: 
the ascendancy of neo-conservative, populist criminologies, the politicisation of law and 
order and the rise of ‘governing through crime’, the emergence of victim-centred justice, 
the re-emotionalisation of crime and justice, net-widening and ‘defining down’ of deviance 
and, underpinning all of this, the hypermediatisation of crime, control and social order 
(Garland, 2001; Ericson, 2006; Simon, 2006; Reiner, 2007; Young, 2007).  
 This process of hypermediatisation has taken place across a rapidly changing media  
environment. There are more news platforms, sites and formats than ever before, and the 
sheer amount of available information is unprecedented. Within an intensely competitive 
market, news becomes  increasingly commodified and journalists increasingly adversarial, 
while sources of all kinds become more professional and adept at dealing with the media. 
Faced with greater choice in a diversified and highly interactive environment, media-savvy 
news audiences fragment. This 24-7 global news mediasphere is light-years from the 
altogether more homogenous conditions explored in Marxist and Post-Marxist analyses of 
reporting crime. As the media environment has changed, so has the terrain upon which 




News…  is not manufactured (neither, therefore, is consent), nor is it ‘constructed’. 
Nor does it just happen. It emerges from the interacting elements of the 
communication environment which prevails in a given media space. These spaces 
contain many social actors striving to manufacture and shape the news, but none has 
any guarantee of success… [J]ust as no amount of meteorological data-gathering  can 
make the weather entirely predictable, so no social actor, be he president, prime 
minister or pope, can predict with any certainty what tomorrow’s news will contain.  
 
In the UK, an already fragmented government struggles to control the crime news agenda in  
a climate where the putative ‘facts’ of the crime problem – as derived from official statistics, 
victim surveys, performance indicators – are spun into a web of conflicting narratives, used 
simultaneously by competing interests as evidence of success and failure, or dismissed 
altogether as fabrication and ‘moral panic’. Hyper-adversarial press reporters go on the 
attack (Barnett, 2002; Fallows, 1996), subjecting official institutions and their senior 
managers – the police, the courts, the prison service, government offices – to a constant 
barrage of criticism for failing to deliver in the democratically mandated task of ‘public 
protection’. Media campaigns are launched in the name of high profile crime victims, whose 
increasingly vociferous and empowered representatives now routinely employ professional 
PR advisers to make their cases more ‘media-friendly’, and therefore more suitable to 
widespread public articulation and dissemination. Media audiences, tired of the ‘permanent 
crisis in criminal justice’, are actively encouraged to participate in the news production 
process. The rise of the ‘citizen journalist’, capable not only of emailing, texting or phoning 
in their views and concerns, but also of providing news organisations with live footage of 
events as they happen, presents an additional challenge to official institutional attempts to 
manage the news process (Gilmour, 2004). Where citizens were once content to consume 
the news, today they are increasingly involved in producing it. producing it. The classic 
modernist frameworks for understanding crime and justice news still have much to offer. 
But they cannot embrace the complexity of contemporary flows of communication power 
and associated perceptions of public credibility in the 24-7 global news mediasphere.  
 Though transformations in the crime and justice and media landscapes have been 
well documented separately, their complex interaction has yet to be adequately explored. 
As this chapter has illustrated, many if not most of the defining studies on news media, 
crime and justice have come from outside criminology. The foundational Marxist studies 
from the Centres at Birmingham, Leicester and Glasgow, the interdisciplinary works 
emerging from the NDC, and the diverse Post-Marxist interventions were mostly situated 
within sociology, media studies and cultural studies. Likewise many of the most significant 
developments or critical commentaries on core theoretical concepts – newsworthiness, fear 
of crime, moral panics. Yet whilst the sociology of media and communications and cultural 
studies have moved on, news media criminology all too frequently remains locked-in to a 
now outdated framework of understanding.  
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 The interdisciplinary, engaged and sustained news media research that defined the 
Marxist and early Post-Marxist periods, has been replaced with a growing reliance on 
superficial content analysis. This is no doubt partly attributable to logistical convenience. 
The emergence of online searchable newspaper databases allow researchers to search, 
retrieve, collate and examine entire bodies of news coverage at the push of a button. The 
analysis of text-based documents can of course reveal much in terms of the meanings given 
to crime and criminal justice in news discourses. But online newspaper databases strip news 
content of its form, colour and style – erasing visual imagery and surrounding stories and 
context. News media analyses are thus increasingly based upon a ‘news residue’ – 
standardised, decontextualised words on a computer screen (Greer, 2009). The visual is 
perhaps ‘the’ defining characteristic of news media today. Since visual attractiveness has 
always been fundamental to television, studies on news broadcasting have naturally 
featured some discussion of visual as a defining characteristic (Golding and Elliott, 1979; 
Schlesinger et al, 1983; Chermak, 1995; Cottle, 2006). Yet whilst the image has always been 
fundamental to printed news, there has until recently been little engagement with the 
visual in criminological studies of the press (Hayward and Presdee, 2010; Jones and Wardle, 
2008; Greer, 2003). In a increasingly visual context of hypermediatisation, attention to news 
images must surely be a priority. Furthermore, the rise in news media content analysis has 
been paralleled with a corresponding decline in research on the news production process. 
Criminologists are no longer engaging with journalists or sources. Finally, with the exception 
of research on fear of crime, news media criminology has tended more often to assume 
than evidence media influence. This was a fundamental dilemma that the GUMG sought to 
address in their research, but news media criminology has been slow to capitalise on the 
availability of methodological approaches which can start to make meaningful sense of the 
influence on consumers of media images of crime and justice. Even Cultural Criminology, 
which is highly sensitised to issues of media and mediatisation, has thus far had little to say 
on the news media (Greer, 2009). 
 Criminology does not currently have the intellectual resources to apprehend the 
massive transformations across the news media environment in recent decades, the visually 
spectacular presentation of crime news as a hypercommodified product, or the increasingly 
interactive manner in which it is created and consumed. What is needed is the systematic 
testing of new theoretical ideas and empirical questions: how chaotic is the global news 
mediasphere; how much influence can powerful source organisations retain in this climate; 
is it possible to manage, if not control, the news process? who are the primary definers in 
the global news mediasphere? Answering these questions requires the development of new 
theoretical and methodological tools that permit the sustained and in depth engagement 
with the contemporary media environment. The acquisition and application of such tools in 
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